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Introduction: 
Somalia. In December 1992, this word conjured up horrific images of extreme 
deprivation and senseless suffering due to prolonged war and famine. Calls for 
intervention were heard and answered resulting in an unprecedented deployment of 
troops for a humanitarian cause. Immediately thereafter, a notable surge of support for 
the United Nations (UN) and its role in the post-Cold War world was evident. 
By June and October 1993, the word "Somalia" invoked more concrete images 
of guns, warfare and, more graphically, of a stripped American being dragged through 
Mogadishu's streets while the US military stood by powerless to intervene. Nearly a 
year after the above mentioned mission was launched, questions quickly rose about the 
proper role of peacekeeping, the competency of US foreign policy and leadership, and 
the US relationship with the United Nations in today's increasingly volatile world. 
With peacekeeping proliferating, at a cost which exceeds the regular UN 
budget, it is increasingly becoming a major concern and tool in international relations. 
Thus, in this case study I plan to examine the role of UN and multilateral 
peacekeeping and its position in the Somalia conflict. Firstly, I plan to delve into a 
short discussion on the advantages, problems and issues entailing peacekeeping. With 
this in mind, later in the paper I will be able to properly assess whether the Somalia 
intervention was a success, failure or whether the intervention was peacekeeping at all, 
as used in the standard definition. Secondly, I will discuss the Somalia conflict: the 
background, origin and mandate of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Also, I 
will examine the actors in the conflict, composition of troops and the current status of 
the operation. Clearly, this part of the paper will be the most lengthy due to the 
explanation of the conflict and its impact on the Somali nation and international 
relations as a whole. It will include a chronological order of events explained in 
detail. Finally, I will evaluate the status of the operation according to Diehl's criteria 
and my own assessments. This will include whether the peacekeeping operation was a 
success or failure. Thus, throughout the paper I will try to offer a clear and concise 
version of the Somali conflict and peacekeeping operations within this framework. 
Part I: 
Factors and Concepts in 
International Peacekeeping 
Definition of Peacekeeping: 
Paul F. Diehl, in his treatise on the subject, states that peacekeeping is used to 
refer to "any international effort involving an operational component to promote the 
termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes." 1 The 
1Diehl, Paul F. International Peacekeeping. Johns Hopkins 
University Press. Baltimore: 1993. pp.4. 
International Peace Academy provides a broader definition stating that peacekeeping 
entails "the prevention, containment...and termination of hostilities ... through the 
medium of a peaceful third party ... to restore and maintain {emphasis added} peace." 2 
Note that the latter definition allows the concepts of peace restoration and maintenance 
which could include the use of armed conflict to achieve the peace and stability 
sought. This has been a matter which has been argued with heated contention due to 
the fact that the use of armed conflict to achieve peace seems to be antithetical in 
nature. 
It must be stated that although most peacekeeping operations function under 
UN authorization and sponsorship, peacekeeping is not specifically laid out within the 
UN Charter. Of course, this has never presented a difficulty because most 
peacekeeping forces consist of diverse nations supplying the monetary and logistic 
support staff on an ad hoc basis. The authority for peacekeeping operations is 
implied, as argued by the United Nations, in the UN Charter by utilizing Articles 40, 
24 and 36. Article 39 of the United Nations' Charter states that a "threat to peace" of 
the international system justifies intervention in domestic affairs to alleviate the danger 
of spillover effects. This case clearly demonstrates the UN's implementation of this 
position. 
Characteristics of Peacekeeping: 
Diehl identifies a number of inherent factors required for a traditional 
2 Diehl, pp. 5 . 
3 
peacekeeping operation. First, permission of the host government where the troops 
will be stationed is a sine qua non for success. Also, peacekeeping troops are neutral 
in a conflict and, thus, they are "not designed to restore order or stop fighting between 
rival enemies" which automatically proscribes, or, rather should proscribe, an offensive 
role by the peacekeepers.3 Diehl states that neutrality is the "final central guideline" 
and the "key element is that their actions neither favor nor be perceived to favor any 
side of the dispute. "4 The fighting should have already ceased by the time the troops 
are deployed, and the peacekeepers should be acting as conciliators and buffers 
between the former disputants. Clearly, the peacekeepers should have a limited 
military capability. 
Of course, all of the above outline the ideal peacekeeping operation. 
Nonetheless, the peacekeepers role should resemble the factors outlined above in order 
to be deemed a pure peacekeeping operation. 
Factors of Peacekeeping: Judging Success or Failure: 
Diehl provides two criteria to judge success or failure in a peacekeeping 
operation. The first criterion is the "ability to deter or prevent violent conflict in the 
area of deployment. "5 The second is the "ability to facilitate the resolution" of the 
3Diehl, pp. 5 . 
4 Diehl, pp. 172. 
5Diehl, pp. 34. 
4 
dispute "underlying the conflict. "6 
In an operation which has properly promoted both the former and the latter, 
success is theoretically attainable. Usually, though, peacekeepers are so involved in 
"keeping the peace" that a suitable dispute resolution process is rarely implemented. 
Diehl's argument implies that peacekeeping promotes a halt in the fighting which 
should provide a climate conducive to negotiations and dispute resolution. However, 
Diehl casts doubt on his own premise by stating that most peacekeeping operations 
"remain separate from any efforts at resolving the dispute. "7 Again, the ideal is the 
objective . 
Diehl also presents a number of factors which also must be stated. Firstly, the 
force composition is a factor. As stated above, the forces must be neutral and one 
should look at the manner of deployment. The efficiency of command and control is a 
factor due to the various nation's willingness to abide by central command's directives. 
Secondly, the authorization of the mission must be analyzed. Who gave the 
authorization? What is the mandate and who is financing the mission? Also, what is 
the scope of the mission and is it too ambitious? 
Thirdly, the political/military context should be examined. The type of conflict 
is a factor: interstate or intrastate? Diehl believes that peacekeeping troops "should be 
6Diehl, pp. 37. 
7Diehl, pp. 38. 
5 
primarily directed at interstate, as opposed to civil (intrastate), conflicts. "8 The case 
discussed below involves in both a humanitarian mission and intrastate conflict. Diehl 
believes that deployment in an urban area is not a good idea because there are too 
many people to handle and problems will surely arise between urban groups and 
troops. Also, the cooperation of the disputants is a factor once the troops are 
deployed. Do they honor past agreements? Are the disputants sub-national actors and 
what is their power? Finally, the behavior of the major powers must be noted. 
Thus, the factors, concepts and indicators for a successful peacekeeping 
operation are many and may be, at the outset, difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, I will 
be using this criteria to evaluate the UNOSOM mission. 
Part II: 
Intervention and Escalation: UNOSOM 
After nearly two years of protracted conflict in Somalia, the world was finally 
morally awakened by sickening scenes of emaciated men, women and children in this 
African nation distressingly displayed by the Western media. 
A primary reason for the famine which had gripped Somalia was the civil war 
which had commenced after the overthrow of dictator Md. Siad Barre in 1991. To 
gain stature vis-a-vis other clans, factions started to capture and impound aid shipments 
bound for outlying communities. Used as a tool for buying support and also as a 
means to raise funds for weapons buildup, the looting of aid supplies such as grain 
8Diehl, pp. 1 71. 
6 
shipments mushroomed due to the lack of law and order.9 
Since the start of the conflict, a plethora of futile UN Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSC) stated that the international organization and its members were 
"gravely alarmed" and "deeply disturbed" by the continually deteriorating situation in 
Somalia. 1° Finally, thanks primarily to the effects of visual mass media, the global 
community took concrete action, initially under the aegis of the United States and its 
deployment of armed forces. 
Thus, in light of the above, I will discuss the UN Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) including the background and origin of the conflict , the mandate of the 
subsequent operation and the status of the mission. 
Background, Origins and Factors: 
Somalia is a land of clans and sub-clans, and I strongly believe that this 
divisive factor is a root cause of Somalia' s massive problems. Clans do provide a 
sense of security and belonging to an otherwise illiterate and burdened population; 
however , these same clans are extremely divisive, and impede the sense of nationhood 
which is so critical in nation-building. The Somalis are essentially a conservative 
people belonging primarily to the Islamic faith which disavows any form of clan 
clustering . Islam relies more on a multinational "brotherhood" which is what appealed 
to so many Islamic converts such as the lower-caste Hindus of India. Unfortunately, 
9The United Nations, Document S/23829. "The Situation in 
Somalia--Report of the Secretary General," 21 April, 1992. 
10 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 733. 
7 
the Somali people continue to disregard this tenet of their faith. 
Somalia's colonial history is one of intense diversity. Colonized by both Italy 
and Britain, the country's colonial legacy can still be seen as a divisive factor. For 
example, the northern part of the country sought the rebirth of a "Somaliland" as an 
independent state separate from southern Somalia in 1991. 
In addition to the factors noted above, the following conditions led to the 
breakdown of security in Somalia. 
1. The proliferation of heavily armed clan militia. Youth whose hopes 
have been dashed by "unrealistically high expectation of the 'spoils' of 
victory" have now disregarded "traditional values such as sanctity of life 
and property." 
2. The presence of a vast amount of arms which were readily available 
to the armed militia helped to create the chaos in Somalia. 
3. As mentioned above, the clan system creates problems. This has a 
"negative dark side and is in a sense irreconcilable with a modern, 
democratic state." 
4. The "total and ... unprecedented destruction of the economy and 
infrastructure" is a continually "destabilizing factor." 
5. The absence of a central government or authority is a problem due 
to the lack of law and order. 
6. Finally, the lack of a proper and swift response from the 
international community to the crisis is a factor. "Timely 
intervention ... could have averted the present crisis, though the task was 
daunting." 11 
Thus, when the clans and sub-clans started to take sides, civil war broke out. 
11 The United Nations, Document S/23829. "The Situation in 
Somalia--Report of the Secretary General," 21 April, 1992. pp. 29-
30 . 
8 
Actors in the Conflict: 
Individuals have an enormous propensity to influence events and it is so with 
the strife in Somalia. The following are the main characters in the case: 
-Siad Barre was the dictator who was ousted in 1991 by a popular clan 
upnsmg. 
-Dr. Ali Mahdi Mohammed was instituted as the interim-President after 
Siad Barre's ousting, however, the other clans thought that their leader 
should have the top prize. 
-General Md. Farah Aidid, the man most instrumental in helping topple 
Siad Barre, felt that he was the right person to lead his country. This is 
the man referred to as the "warlord" and is the person who the UN 
personally targeted for killing 23 Pakistani peacekeepers in June, 1993. 
-Boutros-Ghali succeeded Javier Perez de Cuellar as Secretary General 
of the UN in a time of monumental transition: the Cold War had just 
ended and, after the Gulf War, it appeared that a new multilateralism 
based on collective action was nigh. However, as evidenced by this 
case, conflict was something that was not on the wane. Also, Boutros-
Ghali strongly supported the dictator Siad Barre while in the position of 
Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the 1980's. This was 
later to become an excellent seed of distrust utilized by Md. Farah Aidid 
in rousing the Somali public against UNOSOM and the Secretary-
General. 
-US Admiral (Ret.) Jonathan Howe was appointed as the Secretary 
General's Special Representative to Somalia at US insistence, and was 
the one who oversees UNOSOM and the implementation of UNSC 
Resolutions dealing with Somalia. 
-Of course, President Clinton and his foreign policy team have had an 
influence on events by their support, and then later, lack of support for 
UN policy in Somalia. 
-In October 1993, Amb. Robert F. Oakley, Bush's former Special 
Representative to Somalia and a former US Ambassador to Somalia, 
was asked to resume his old duties and to try and find a political 
settlement including a reconciliation with Md. Farah Aidid. 
The above people will be referred to throughout the paper. 
9 
Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM I: 
Operation Restore Hope was an operation authorized by UNSC Resolution 794 
and thus action was taken under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN representing a 
Unified Command structure. It also welcomed other member nations to provide 
support with "military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in 
kind. "12 The Secretary General was requested to establish a fund for the operation. 
Restore Hope consisted of 31,000 troops from 27 different nations at the height of the 
operation. The mandate of the operation was taken under UNSC Resolution 794 
which allowed for the Unified Command, led by the US, to establish a secure 
environment for relief workers so relief supplies could be safely distributed . 
After the inception of Operation Restore Hope in late 1992, when US Marines 
hit the beaches of Mogadishu on December 9, the composition of UNOSOM was 
primarily American. Upon the deployment of the $750 million operation, President 
George Bush stated in a letter to Congress that: 
in my judgement , the deployment of US Armed Forces under US 
Command to Somalia as part of this multilateral response to the 
Resolution [794] is necessary to address a major humanitarian calamity , 
avert related threats to international peace and security, 
and protect the safety of Americans and others in relief operations. 13 
Clearly, George Bush intended a purely humanitarian mission which would 
12 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 794, pp. 4. 
13 US Department of State. Department of State Dispatch. Vol. 
3, no . 50. 14 December, 1992. 
10 
safeguard the relief supplies and protect UN and other relief workers. In December 
1992, Mr. Bush had been unseated by then President-elect Bill Clinton who had 
campaigned with a platform oriented to combatting US domestic problems first. 
UNOSOM I had been an ongoing operation since the UNSC approved the 
mission in March, 1992 with UNSC Resolution 751. Thus, it must be noted that the 
United Nations had already stationed observer, technical and a small contingent of 
peacekeeping forces in Mogadishu, the capital, before the arrival of the Americans. 
Troop deployment consisted of nations as diverse as Nigeria and Bangladesh which 
provided ( and still do provide) contingents of military and support staff. This was to 
ensure the full supply of humanitarian relief; however, due to clan warfare, this small 
relief force had been nearly defenseless and incapable of even self-protection much 
less protecting aid convoys and the general Somali public. It must be noted that many 
of the forces from other nations (Pakistan being a striking example) brought with them 
supplies that were heavily outdated. It was clear that a well-supplied force of several 
thousand was needed to restore order and tangible humanitarian relief. 
In his letter to Congress, George Bush also declared that: 
"US Armed Forces will remain in Somalia only as long as necessary to 
establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief...and will then turn 
over the responsibility of maintaining this environment to a UN peacekeeping 
force ... We believe that prolonged operations will not be necessary { emphasis 
added}." 14 
However, the daunting task of securing an environment conducive to delivering 
14 US Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. 14 
December, 1992. 
11 
relief supplies was more difficult than first realized. 
On January 15, 1993 the UN sponsored talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia where 
feuding Somali clan militias signed a pact to disarm and stop the fighting. These 
promises were quickly broken, however, as UNOSOM II took over the reins of 
enforcement. Somali clans, primarily the Somali National Alliance (SNA), broke the 
cease fire and the SNA started to become the nemesis of the UNOSOM. 
UNOSOM/1: 
Restore Hope and UNOSOM I were disbanded on May 4, 1993 by 
authorization of the UNSC. This allowed a UN Command to take over the operations 
which created UNOSOM II, however, a large US contingent was still available at 
strong UN insistence. It must be mentioned that the United States in past actions, such 
as the Gulf War, has never subjected its troops to command outside the US Armed 
Forces structure. However, for the first time, some of President Clinton's foreign 
policy advisors felt that it would be possible for US forces to take orders from UN 
Commanders. Finally, with strong reservations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Colin Powell, acquiesced. With this acquiescence, some reserve was 
still displayed: the Pentagon did demand that the UNOSOM mission be commanded by 
an American, retired Admiral Jonathon Howe, a former Deputy National Security 
Advisor in the Bush Administration. Allowing an American to command UNOSOM 
would allow, it seemed, some American discretion and oversight in UN actions. 
The relief efforts had been very successful since Restore Hope's inception. 
Food was flowing to the outlying areas and the markets were again bustling with trade 
12 
and commerce. However, restoring relief operations was not the only part of the 
mandate. As Boutros-Ghali states: 
I have repeatedly emphasized that disarmament is indispensable for the 
establishment of peace and security in Somalia. This is not only 
mandated by the Security Council, but also recognized by virtually all 
Somalis, including the leaders of the political factions ... 15 
The Secretary-General and the new US Administration insisted that a political 
settlement between the disputants was necessary before UNOSOM could withdraw, a 
date which kept being extended indefinitely. Boutros-Ghali felt that no political 
solution could be achieved without first disbanding and disarming the clanned militia 
whose banditry had initially disrupted the relief operations. 
At first, the US Administration resisted this interpretation of the UNSC 
Resolutions. It thought that its humanitarian mission did not include disarming the 
militia and the general public. However, the Administration quickly realized that the 
Secretary's assertion was right, but the question was how to implement the strategy? 
Due to the civil war which had ravaged the society, Somalia had no functioning 
government, no police force and the law structure had crumbled and was 
dysfunctional. Thus, the UNOSOM forces, including the US contingent, started taking 
the role of not just peacekeepers, but peacemakers. UNOSOM troops, out of 
necessity, started taking the role of the police force and law. This was resented by 
some Somalis, especially by clan leaders, who had controlled certain outlying areas 
and Mogadishu, who felt that their power was being eroded. 
15 United Nations Security Council. "Further Report of the 
Secretary General," UN Document S/26317, 17 August, 1993. 
13 
Post-5th June UNOSOM: "Assertive Multilateralism": 
The resentment escalated against UNOSOM although most Somalis realized 
that the situation was much better than what they had endured for the past two years. 
However, the clan leaders intensified anti-UN propaganda via radio broadcasts, and the 
armed militia became much more openly aggressive and hostile against UNOSOM 
forces. The situation rapidly deteriorated, culminating in the massacre of June 5, 
1993, and the subsequent UNSC Resolution which responded to the said acts of 
aggression. Both are described below. 
On June 5, twenty-three Pakistani peacekeepers were killed during a show of 
force by militia-men allegedly under the command of General Md. Farah Aidid. The 
United Nations responded with UNSC Resolution 837 which strongly condemned "the 
use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the ... SNA (Somali National Alliance), to incite 
attacks against United Nations personnel." 16 Admiral Howe shut down the SNA's 
radio station which broadcast such "venomous propaganda of hate through the media 
against UNOSOM II." 17 
Thus, the United Nations declared in Resolution 837 that by "acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations" it strongly condemned the armed 
attacks which appeared to have been a "calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire 
violations." The resolution noted that the UNSC: 
Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized ... to take all necessary 
16 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 837, pp. 2. 
17 British Broadcasting Corporation, 14 June, 1993. 
14 
measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks .. .including 
against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, ( and) 
including ... the investigation of their actions and their arrest and 
detention for prosecution, trial and punishment { emphasis added}; 
Requests the Secretary General to inquire into the incident, with 
particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved. 18 
We must also remember the definition of peacekeeping that Diehl presented. 
Somalia and UNOSOM: 
A Case in International Peacekeeping 
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Introduction: 
Somalia. In December 1992, this word conjured up horrific images of extreme 
deprivation and senseless suffering due to prolonged war and famine. Calls for 
intervention were heard and answered resulting in an unprecedented deployment of 
troops for a humanitarian cause. Immediately thereafter, a notable surge of support for 
the United Nations (UN) and its role in the post-Cold War world was evident. 
By June and October 1993, the word "Somalia" invoked more concrete images 
of guns, warfare and, more graphically, of a stripped American being dragged through 
Mogadishu's streets while the US military stood by powerless to intervene. Nearly a 
year after the above mentioned mission was launched, questions quickly rose about the 
proper role of peacekeeping, the competency of US foreign policy and leadership, and 
the US relationship with the United Nations in today's increasingly volatile world. 
With peacekeeping proliferating, at a cost which exceeds the regular UN 
budget, it is increasingly becoming a major concern and tool in international relations. 
Thus, in this case study I plan to examine the role of UN and multilateral 
peacekeeping and its position in the Somalia conflict. Firstly, I plan to delve into a 
short discussion on the advantages, problems and issues entailing peacekeeping. With 
this in mind, later in the paper I will be able to properly assess whether the Somalia 
intervention was a success, failure or whether the intervention was peacekeeping at all, 
as used in the standard definition. Secondly, I will discuss the Somalia conflict: the 
background, origin and mandate of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Also, I 
will examine the actors in the conflict, composition of troops and the current status of 
the operation. Clearly, this part of the paper will be the most lengthy due to the 
explanation of the conflict and its impact on the Somali nation and international 
relations as a whole. It will include a chronological order of events explained in 
detail. Finally , I will evaluate the status of the operation according to Diehl's criteria 
and my own assessments. This will include whether the peacekeeping operation was a 
success or failure . Thus, throughout the paper I will try to offer a clear and concise 
version of the Somali conflict and peacekeeping operations within this framework. 
Part/: 
Factors and Concepts in 
International Peacekeeping 
Definition of Peacekeeping: 
Paul F. Diehl, in his treatise on the subject, states that peacekeeping is used to 
refer to "any international effort involving an operational component to promote the 
termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes." 1 The 
1Diehl, Paul F. International Peacekeeping. Johns Hopkins 
University Press. Baltimore: 1993. pp.4. 
International Peace Academy provides a broader definition stating that peacekeeping 
entails "the prevention, containment. .. and termination of hostilities ... through the 
medium of a peaceful third party ... to restore and maintain {emphasis added} peace." 2 
Note that the latter definition allows the concepts of peace restoration and maintenance 
which could include the use of armed conflict to achieve the peace and stability 
sought. This has been a matter which has been argued with heated contention due to 
the fact that the use of armed conflict to achieve peace seems to be antithetical in 
nature. 
It must be stated that although most peacekeeping operations function under 
UN authorization and sponsorship, peacekeeping is not specifically laid out within the 
UN Charter. Of course, this has never presented a difficulty because most 
peacekeeping forces consist of diverse nations supplying the monetary and logistic 
support staff on an ad hoc basis. The authority for peacekeeping operations is 
implied, as argued by the United Nations, in the UN Charter by utilizing Articles 40, 
24 and 36. Article 39 of the United Nations' Charter states that a "threat to peace" of 
the international system justifies intervention in domestic affairs to alleviate the danger 
of spillover effects. This case clearly demonstrates the UN' s implementation of this 
position. 
Characteristics of Peacekeeping: 
Diehl identifies a number of inherent factors required for a traditional 
2Diehl, pp . 5. 
3 
peacekeeping operation. First, permission of the host government where the troops 
will be stationed is a sine qua non for success. Also, peacekeeping troops are neutral 
in a conflict and, thus, they are "not designed to restore order or stop fighting between 
rival enemies" which automatically proscribes , or, rather should proscribe , an offensive 
role by the peacekeepers. 3 Diehl states that neutrality is the "final central guideline" 
and the "key element is that their actions neither favor nor be perceived to favor any 
side of the dispute . "4 The fighting should have already ceased by the time the troops 
are deployed, and the peacekeepers should be acting as conciliators and buffers 
between the former disputants. Clearly, the peacekeepers should have a limited 
military capability. 
Of course, all of the above outline the ideal peacekeeping operation. 
Nonetheless , the peacekeepers role should resemble the factors outlined above in order 
to be deemed a pure peacekeeping operation. 
Factors of Peacekeeping: Judging Success or Failure: 
Diehl provides two criteria to judge success or failure in a peacekeeping 
operation. The first criterion is the "ability to deter or prevent violent conflict in the 
area of deployment. "5 The second is the "ability to facilitate the resolution" of the 
3 Diehl, pp. 5 . 
4 Diehl, pp. 172. 
5Diehl, pp. 34. 
4 
dispute "underlying the conflict. "6 
In an operation which has properly promoted both the former and the latter, 
success is theoretically attainable. Usually, though, peacekeepers are so involved in 
"keeping the peace" that a suitable dispute resolution process is rarely implemented. 
Diehl' s argument implies that peacekeeping promotes a halt in the fighting which 
should provide a climate conducive to negotiations and dispute resolution. However, 
Diehl casts doubt on his own premise by stating that most peacekeeping operations 
"remain separate from any efforts at resolving the dispute. "7 Again, the ideal is the 
objective. 
Diehl also presents a number of factors which also must be stated. Firstly, the 
force composition is a factor. As stated above, the forces must be neutral and one 
should look at the manner of deployment. The efficiency of command and control is a 
factor due to the various nation's willingness to abide by central command's directives. 
Secondly, the authorization of the mission must be analyzed. Who gave the 
authorization? What is the mandate and who is financing the mission? Also, what is 
the scope of the mission and is it too ambitious? 
Thirdly, the political/military context should be examined. The type of conflict 
is a factor: interstate or intrastate? Diehl believes that peacekeeping troops "should be 
6Diehl, pp. 37. 
7Diehl, pp. 38. 
5 
primarily directed at interstate, as opposed to civil (intrastate), conflicts. "8 The case 
discussed below involves in both a humanitarian mission and intrastate conflict. Diehl 
believes that deployment in an urban area is not a good idea because there are too 
many people to handle and problems will surely arise between urban groups and 
troops. Also, the cooperation of the disputants is a factor once the troops are 
deployed. Do they honor past agreements? Are the disputants sub-national actors and 
what is their power? Finally, the behavior of the major powers must be noted. 
Thus, the factors, concepts and indicators for a successful peacekeeping 
operation are many and may be, at the outset, difficult to achieve. Nevertheless , I will 
be using this criteria to evaluate the UNOSOM mission. 
Part JI: 
Intervention and Escalation: UNOSOM 
After nearly two years of protracted conflict in Somalia, the world was finally 
morally awakened by sickening scenes of emaciated men, women and children in this 
African nation distressingly displayed by the Western media. 
A primary reason for the famine which had gripped Somalia was the civil war 
which had commenced after the overthrow of dictator Md. Siad Barre in 1991. To 
gain stature vis-a-vis other clans, factions started to capture and impound aid shipments 
bound for outlying communities. Used as a tool for buying support and also as a 
means to raise funds for weapons buildup, the looting of aid supplies such as grain 
8Diehl, pp. 1 71. 
6 
shipments mushroomed due to the lack of law and order.9 
Since the start of the conflict, a plethora of futile UN Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSC) stated that the international organization and its members were 
"gravely alarmed" and "deeply disturbed" by the continually deteriorating situation in 
Somalia.1° Finally, thanks primarily to the effects of visual mass media, the global 
community took concrete action, initially under the aegis of the United States and its 
deployment of armed forces. 
Thus, in light of the above, I will discuss the UN Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) including the background and origin of the conflict, the mandate of the 
subsequent operation and the status of the mission. 
Backrround, Oririns and Factors: 
Somalia is a land of clans and sub-clans, and I strongly believe that this 
divisive factor is a root cause of Somalia's massive problems. Clans do provide a 
sense of security and belonging to an otherwise illiterate and burdened population; 
however, these same clans are extremely divisive, and impede the sense of nationhood 
which is so critical in nation-building. The Somalis are essentially a conservative 
people belonging primarily to the Islamic faith which disavows any form of clan 
clustering. Islam relies more on a multinational "brotherhood" which is what appealed 
to so many Islamic converts such as the lower-caste Hindus of India. Unfortunately, 
9The United Nations, Document S/23829. "The Situation in 
Somalia--Report of the Secretary General," 21 April, 1992. 
10 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 733. 
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the Somali people continue to disregard this tenet of their faith. 
Somalia's colonial history is one of intense diversity. Colonized by both Italy 
and Britain, the country's colonial legacy can still be seen as a divisive factor. For 
example, the northern part of the country sought the rebirth of a "Somaliland" as an 
independent state separate from southern Somalia in 1991. 
In addition to the factors noted above, the following conditions led to the 
breakdown of security in Somalia. 
1. The proliferation of heavily armed clan militia. Youth whose hopes 
have been dashed by "unrealistically high expectation of the 'spoils' of 
victory" have now disregarded "traditional values such as sanctity of life 
and property." 
2. The presence of a vast amount of arms which were readily available 
to the armed militia helped to create the chaos in Somalia. 
3. As mentioned above, the clan system creates problems. This has a 
"negative dark side and is in a sense irreconcilable with a modem, 
democratic state." 
4. The "total and ... unprecedented destruction of the economy and 
infrastructure" is a continually "destabilizing factor." 
5. The absence of a central government or authority is a problem due 
to the lack of law and order. 
6. Finally, the lack of a proper and swift response from the 
international community to the crisis is a factor. "Timely 
intervention ... could have averted the present crisis, though the task was 
daunting." 11 
Thus, when the clans and sub-clans started to take sides, civil war broke out. 
11 The United Nations, Document S/23829. "The Situation in 
Somalia--Report of the Secretary General," 21 April, 1992. pp. 29-
30. 
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Actors in the Conflict: 
Individuals have an enormous propensity to influence events and it is so with 
the strife in Somalia. The following are the main characters in the case: 
-Siad Barre was the dictator who was ousted in 1991 by a popular clan 
uprising. 
-Dr. Ali Mahdi Mohammed was instituted as the interim-President after 
Siad Barre's ousting, however, the other clans thought that their leader 
should have the top prize. 
-General Md. Farah Aidid, the man most instrumental in helping topple 
Siad Barre, felt that he was the right person to lead his country. This is 
the man referred to as the "warlord" and is the person who the UN 
personally targeted for killing 23 Pakistani peacekeepers in June, 1993. 
-Boutros-Ghali succeeded Javier Perez de Cuellar as Secretary General 
of the UN in a time of monumental transition: the Cold War had just 
ended and, after the Gulf War, it appeared that a new multilateralism 
based on collective action was nigh. However, as evidenced by this 
case, conflict was something that was not on the wane. Also, Boutros-
Ghali strongly supported the dictator Siad Barre while in the position of 
Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the 1980's. This was 
later to become an excellent seed of distrust utilized by Md. Farah Aidid 
in rousing the Somali public against UNOSOM and the Secretary-
General. 
-US Admiral (Ret.) Jonathan Howe was appointed as the Secretary 
General's Special Representative to Somalia at US insistence, and was 
the one who oversees UNOSOM and the implementation of UNSC 
Resolutions dealing with Somalia. 
-Of course, President Clinton and his foreign policy team have had an 
influence on events by their support, and then later, lack of support for 
UN policy in Somalia. 
-In October 1993, Amb. Robert F. Oakley. Bush's former Special 
Representative to Somalia and a former US Ambassador to Somalia, 
was asked to resume his old duties and to try and find a political 
settlement including a reconciliation with Md. Farah Aidid. 
The above people will be referred to throughout the paper. 
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Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM /: 
Operation Restore Hope was an operation authorized by UNSC Resolution 794 
and thus action was taken under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN representing a 
Unified Command structure. It also welcomed other member nations to provide 
support with "military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in 
kind." 12 The Secretary General was requested to establish a fund for the operation. 
Restore Hope consisted of 31,000 troops from 27 different nations at the height of the 
operation. The mandate of the operation was taken under UNSC Resolution 794 
which allowed for the Unified Command, led by the US, to establish a secure 
environment for relief workers so relief supplies could be safely distributed. 
After the inception of Operation Restore Hope in late 1992, when US Marines 
hit the beaches of Mogadishu on December 9, the composition of UNOSOM was 
primarily American. Upon the deployment of the $750 million operation, President 
George Bush stated in a letter to Congress that: 
in my judgement, the deployment of US Armed Forces under US 
Command to Somalia as part of this multilateral response to the 
Resolution [794] is necessary to address a major humanitarian calamity, 
avert related threats to international peace and security, 
and protect the safety of Americans and others in relief operations. 13 
Clearly, George Bush intended a purely humanitarian mission which would 
12 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 794, pp. 4. 
13 US Department of State. Department of State Dispatch. Vol. 
3, no. 50. 14 December, 1992. 
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safeguard the relief supplies and protect UN and other relief workers. In December 
1992, Mr. Bush had been unseated by then President-elect Bill Clinton who had 
campaigned with a platform oriented to combatting US domestic problems first. 
UNOSOM I had been an ongoing operation since the UNSC approved the 
mission in March, 1992 with UNSC Resolution 751. Thus, it must be noted that the 
United Nations had already stationed observer, technical and a small contingent of 
peacekeeping forces in Mogadishu, the capital, before the arrival of the Americans. 
Troop deployment consisted of nations as diverse as Nigeria and Bangladesh which 
provided (and still do provide) contingents of military and support staff. This was to 
ensure the full supply of humanitarian relief; however, due to clan warfare, this small 
relief force had been nearly defenseless and incapable of even self-protection much 
less protecting aid convoys and the general Somali public. It must be noted that many 
of the forces from other nations (Pakistan being a striking example) brought with them 
supplies that were heavily outdated. It was clear that a well-supplied force of several 
thousand was needed to restore order and tangible humanitarian relief. 
In his letter to Congress, George Bush also declared that: 
"US Armed Forces will remain in Somalia only as long as necessary to 
establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief ... and will then turn 
over the responsibility of maintaining this environment to a UN peacekeeping 
force ... We believe that prolonged operations will not be necessary { emphasis 
added}." 14 
However, the daunting task of securing an environment conducive to delivering 
14 US Department of State. Department of State Bulletin. 14 
December, 1992. 
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relief supplies was more difficult than first realized. 
On January 15, 1993 the UN sponsored talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia where 
feuding Somali clan militias signed a pact to disarm and stop the fighting. These 
promises were quickly broken, however, as UNOSOM II took over the reins of 
enforcement. Somali clans, primarily the Somali National Alliance (SNA), broke the 
cease fire and the SNA started to become the nemesis of the UNOSOM. 
UNOSOMII: 
Restore Hope and UNOSOM I were disbanded on May 4, 1993 by 
authorization of the UNSC. This allowed a UN Command to take over the operations 
which created UNOSOM II, however, a large US contingent was still available at 
strong UN insistence. It must be mentioned that the United States in past actions, such 
as the Gulf War, has never subjected its troops to command outside the US Armed 
Forces structure. However, for the first time, some of President Clinton's foreign 
policy advisors felt that it would be possible for US forces to take orders from UN 
Commanders. Finally, with strong reservations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Colin Powell, acquiesced. With this acquiescence, some reserve was 
still displayed: the Pentagon did demand that the UNOSOM mission be commanded by 
an American, retired Admiral Jonathon Howe, a former Deputy National Security 
Advisor in the Bush Administration. Allowing an American to command UNOSOM 
would allow, it seemed, some American discretion and oversight in UN actions. 
The relief efforts had been very successful since Restore Hope's inception. 
Food was flowing to the outlying areas and the markets were again bustling with trade 
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and commerce. However, restoring relief operations was not the only part of the 
mandate. As Boutros-Ghali states: 
I have repeatedly emphasized that disarmament is indispensable for the 
establishment of peace and security in Somalia. This is not only 
mandated by the Security Council, but also recognized by virtually all 
Somalis , including the leaders of the political factions ... 15 
The Secretary-General and the new US Administration insisted that a political 
settlement between the disputants was necessary before UNOSOM could withdraw , a 
date which kept being extended indefinitely. Boutros-Ghali felt that no political 
solution could be achieved without first disbanding and disarming the clanned militia 
whose banditry had initially disrupted the relief operations. 
At first, the US Administration resisted this interpretation of the UNSC 
Resolutions. It thought that its humanitarian mission did not include disarming the 
militia and the general public. However, the Administration quickly realized that the 
Secretary ' s assertion was right , but the question was how to implement the strategy? 
Due to the civil war which had ravaged the society , Somalia had no functioning 
government, no police force and the law structure had crumbled and was 
dysfunctional. Thus , the UNOSOM forces, including the US contingent , started taking 
the role of not just peacekeepers, but peacemakers. UNOSOM troops, out of 
necessity, started taking the role of the police force and law. This was resented by 
some Somalis, especially by clan leaders, who had controlled certain outlying areas 
and Mogadishu, who felt that their power was being eroded. 
15 United Nations Security Council. "Further Report of the 
Secretary General," UN Document S/26317, 17 August, 1993. 
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Post-5th June UNOSOM: "Assertive Multilateralism": 
The resentment escalated against UNOSOM although most Somalis realized 
that the situation was much better than what they had endured for the past two years. 
However, the clan leaders intensified anti-UN propaganda via radio broadcasts, and the 
armed militia became much more openly aggressive and hostile against UNOSOM 
forces. The situation rapidly deteriorated, culminating in the massacre of June 5, 
1993, and the subsequent UNSC Resolution which responded to the said acts of 
aggression. Both are described below. 
On June 5, twenty-three Pakistani peacekeepers were killed during a show of 
force by militia-men allegedly under the command of General Md. Farah Aidid. The 
United Nations responded with UNSC Resolution 837 which strongly condemned "the 
use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the ... SNA (Somali National Alliance) , to incite 
attacks against United Nations personnel." 16 Admiral Howe shut down the SNA's 
radio station which broadcast such "venomous propaganda of hate through the media 
against UNOSOM II." 17 
Thus, the United Nations declared in Resolution 837 that by "acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations" it strongly condemned the armed 
attacks which appeared to have been a "calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire 
violations." The resolution noted that the UNSC: 
Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized ... to take all necessary 
16 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 837, pp. 2. 
17 British Broadcasting Corporation, 14 June, 1993. 
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measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks .. .including 
against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, (and) 
including ... the investigation of their actions and their arrest and 
detention for prosecution, trial and punishment { emphasis added}; 
Requests the Secretary General to inquire into the incident, with 
particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved. 18 
We must also remember the definition of peacekeeping that Diehl presented. 
Being neutral in a conflict is inherent in a peacekeeping operation and a limited 
military capability is also a factor. The Resolution continued with the following : 
Urges Member States to contribute, on an emergency basis, military 
support and transportation, including armored personnel carriers, tanks 
and attack helicopters , to provide UNOSOM II the capability 
appropriately to confront and deter armed attacks directed against it in 
the accomplishment of its mandate. 19 
Peacekeeping operations , as viewed utilizing Diehl's definition, should not 
require such heavily armed personnel. Clearly, as evidenced by the above resolution, 
these conditions were being violated by mere practicality and, perhaps, also by a sense 
of revenge. The request for attack helicopters was an ominous sign indeed and 
traditional peacekeeping methods were clearly not being utilized. The operation was 
starting to look like the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) where there was a 
"disintegration of administrative order" and UN troops were quickly pulled in to the 
conflict. 20 The question of whether this was an instance of self-defense must be 
18 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 837, pp. 2 . 
19 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 837, pp. 3 . 
2 0D iehl, pp. 50. 
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raised. 
However, the concern that this was not a traditional peacekeeping operation 
was previously recognized by the Secretary-General and by the UNSC. In his report 
of 19 December 1992, Boutros-Ghali stated such: 
The present position is thus that the Security Council, having accepted 
my advice that the traditional peace-keeping model was not suitable to 
the Somali situation ... has entrusted to certain Member States ... the 
responsibility of creating a secure environment. It is the wish of the 
Security Council that the transition back to peace-keeping operations 
should be achieved promptly. 21 
Thus, it could be argued that the UN had already recognized the unique nature 
of UNOSOM and was inclined to use additional means outside traditional 
peacekeeping methods to ensure the success of the operation. Madeleine Albright, the 
US representative to the United Nations , declared that this policy could be called 
"assertive multilateralism"--a step up from traditional peacekeeping . What it had 
become was peace-enforc ement. 
Resolution 837 of June 6, quoted extensively above, was used to justify the 
capture, detainment and punishment of those responsible for the attack on the 
peacekeepers. This made the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and its leaders de facto 
enemies of UNOSOM II as it was widely believed that it was this faction which had 
instigated the attack. The United States backed "without reservation the Security 
Council resolution calling for punishment," however, "the general's name (Aidid) was 
2 1The United Nations. "The Situation in Somalia- -Report of the 
Secretary General," 19 December, 1992. 
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removed from the document only at African insistence. "22 On June 14, Admiral 
Howe announced that UNOSOM II "is impartial in the Somali conflict. It does not 
favour any particular group and is here to protect your interests. "23 However, this 
statement was negated on June 24 as UN helicopters showered Mogadishu with posters 
offering a $25,000 reward for Aidid. The stakes were high. 
UNSC Resolution 837 and Personalization of the Conflict: 
General Md. Farah Aidid, leader of the SNA, quickly became an enemy of the 
Western press and was labeled "fugitive Warlord Aidid." It was reported that Aidid , 
in hiding, "masterminded fatal attacks on UN forces and Western journalists--and 
consolidated his power and a swelling reputation as the underdog who stood up to the 
West."24 
This "swelling reputation" had grave implications for UNOSOM II. The 
Somali population, getting increasingly used to available food supplies secured by 
UNOSOM , felt that the UN was being excessively unfair to a particular faction. Also , 
Aidid, in trying to rouse public opinion against UNOSOM, reminded the Somalis of 
the role Boutros-Ghali played in Somalia's affairs in the late 1980's. Boutros-Ghali 
had supported the dictator Siad Barre and Aidid utilized this to his own benefit. 
In Mogadishu, fighting between UNOSOM forces and pro-Aidid factions 
22 The Economist. 10 October, 1993. pp. 45. 
23 British Broadcasting Corporation . 14 June, 1993. 
2 4Newsweek. 26 July, 1993. pp. 34 
17 
escalated. In mid-June the requested attack helicopters and other heavy artillery had 
been delivered and UNOSOM tried to "surgically remove the Aidid malignancy" by 
attacking the weapons caches and SNA command and control centers. Even if surgical 
removal was the intended objective, it was not the result. "By week's end at least 60 
Somalis and five UN peacekeepers had been killed ... and scores wounded by the 
fighting. "25 
UNOSOM II was quickly degenerating into full-scale guerilla warfare. 
Missiles targeted for Aidid militia would run errant and fall onto civilian-occupied 
houses. Even with this, Adm. Howe indicated that the mission was "a complete 
success ... a true, superb United Nations performance." 26 It is questionable that the 
mission was a "complete success" or "superb" given that Aidid was not captured and 
that heavy civilian casualties accompanied the attack. The UN was quickly losing its 
neutral status, one of Diehl' s major factors for success. 
Later, in July, US Cobra helicopters fired TOW missiles and cannons shattering 
a villa that was thought to hold General Aidid, killing at least 50 Somalis. This 
provoked a riot where four foreign journalists were murdered. Again, Aidid was not 
captured and it was rumored that Aidid had been tipped off by the Italian UN 
contingent. The UN had found a personal enemy and that enemy was gaining hero 
status in his own country. 
Diehl does not state that public opinion and support of an operation is a major 
25 US News and World Report. 28 June, 1993. pp. 39. 
26 Ibid, pp. 39. 
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factor, but I think that this is very important. Once a large percentage of the Somali 
population is against a mission, then, I believe, failure is imminent especially if they 
have a leader to rally behind. 
Not all countries in UNOSOM or people involved in the Operation were 
content with the increasing personalization of the conflict. As noted above, it was 
widely thought that Aidid had been tipped off and was thus able to escape capture. 
The day after this raid, Kofi Annan, the Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping at 
the UN, announced that the Italian commander , Gen. Bruno Loi, was being removed 
from his post. "Did the Italians warn Aidid? ' Draw your own conclusions ,' said a 
senior US official. "27 
The firing outraged the Italians and soon the Italian contingent was being fired 
on by gunmen loyal to Ali Mahdi Mohammed , chief rival of Aidid who accused the 
Italians of being "secretly married" to Aidid. It seemed that a proxy war was in the 
making and Somalia threatened to "become a signal failure, raising the question of 
whether there is anything more than a semantic difference between 'peace 
enforcement' and classic military occupation , with all its perils. "28 
It was reported at this time that Mogadishu ,was as dangerous as it was when 
Restore Hope began. A humorous anecdote aptly d1escribes the situation in the 
summer of 1993: Admiral Howe was so worried about his own safety that he 
"urinates in a bottle he keeps under his bed rather tlnan venture outside his trailer at 
2 7Newsweek. 26 July, 1993. pp. 3 2. 
2 8Newsweek. 26 July, 1993. pp. 3 3. 
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night and run the risk of snipers. "29 
The Guns of October : 
The situation steadily deteriorated and, by the end of the summer, the world 
community was became increasingly anxious over the role of UNOSOM and the 
personalization of the conflict. Aid distributors were vocally critical of the UN 
operation understandably stating that the increased emphasis on military operations was 
impeding the original mission: aid distribution. 
This worry turned into outright opposition when, on October 3, another mission 
involving US Rangers to capture Gen. Aidid and his top lieutenants was foiled by 
sniper fire. A dismal failure, the deaths of 17 American soldiers and the capture of a 
US helicopter pilot, Michael Durant, produced a massively negative response by the 
American public and Congress. 30 
However, the greatest outrage occurred when reporters snapped pictures of 
Somali civilians dragging a stripped, dead American soldier through the streets of 
Mogadishu. Public opinion, already taxed by botched raids earlier in the summer, 
were horrified by the scenes on television and in the news magazines. The American 
public was outraged and could not comprehend how the Somali public, which had 
benefitted from food supplied and distributed by US troops, could have such open 
29 Ibid, pp. 33. 
30 Note: In August, President Clinton deployed US Rangers and, 
reportedly, an elite anti-terrorist unit with the primary mission 
of capturing Aidid. The contingent was later redirected to finding 
and rescuing the American pilot. 
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hostilities to those that were providing such vital humanitarian assistance. 
Some Congresspersons called for immediate withdrawal of all US troops, but 
President Clinton responded with a doubling of US troops to protect those already 
there. However, it was made clear that these troops were not there for a "long-term 
role" and would "be under unfettered American control." Also, the "more important--
and, to many, depressing--part of the president's announcement was that virtually all 
American forces were to be out of Somalia by March 31, 1994." Kofi Annan tried to 
reiterate that "the UN force would 'unravel' without the American units," but the US 
Senate passed a resolution strongly endorsing President Clinton's pledge to withdraw 
by March.31 
Political Reconciliation and the Future: 
With a hostile electorate and Congress demanding a change in policy in 
Somalia, this turn of events also allowed the display of an increasing frustration of the 
Clinton Administration with the UN and its handling of the Somali operation. 
The US Administration took this opportunity to openly criticize the UN's handling of 
its operation in Somalia, even though US troops comprised the majority of United 
Nations forces. It is interesting that the US Administration was so vocally critical of 
the UN operation and handling of the mission as the US had been the leading force. It 
wasn't until major catastrophe i.e. Americans getting killed, that the US was critical. 
The US declared that it would still consult and coordinate with UNOSOM, but would 
31 The Economist. 16 October, 1993. pp. 45. 
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resume command and control of its own forces. 
Present Status of the Mission: 
Presently, it is argued that there is a "behind the scenes tug of war over the 
control and purpose of peacemaking in Somalia." Boutros-Ghali advocates a "patient 
effort to coax a new political system" out of the rival factions, and the Clinton 
Administration has limited its goals there to "creating stability so that the previous 
chaos will not recur" once US troops withdraw in March, 1994.32 Ambassador 
Albright announced that the Clinton Administration had shifted its course and told 
Boutros-Ghali that the "United States would begin an aggressive peace initiative with 
an independent envoy who would report to Washington, not to the United Nations." 33 
Boutros-Ghali advocates a continued proactive policy in Somalia while the 
Clinton Administration has backed off such an approach. President Clinton assigned 
veteran diplomat Robert Oakley, who was a former Ambassador and Special 
Representative to Somalia, to seek a political settlement with all factions, including the 
SNA and its leader, Md. Farah Aidid. Mr. Oakley is not well-liked by UN operatives 
due to his individualist style, but Mr. Oakley does know the region well and may 
make a difference in achieving the political resolution sought. 
In late November and early December, the President of Ethiopia convened talks 
32 The Washington Post. 16 October, 1993. 
33 The New York Times. 16 October, 1993. 
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in Addis Abbaba in order to once again cajole political reconciliation between the 
parties. Md. Farah Aidid attended and called the UNOSOM mission a catastrophe 
calling for it to leave his country. Ali Mahdi Mohammad's clan would not attend due 
to Aidid's presence and the mediator, Ethiopia's President, walked out of the talks due 
to the factions unwillingness to produce substantive results. 
Part III: 
Success or Failure: UNOSOM 
Clearly, UNOSOM has not been perfect, nor has it been without controversy. 
Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM I were successes if viewed with the following 
quotation in mind. It helped fulfill the mandate of UNSC Resolution 794 which was 
"determined to establish ... the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance" and "to establish ... a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations 
in Somalia." By March , 1993 humanitarian relief was flowing to villages such as 
Kismayu and Berbere and also within Mogadishu proper. 
However, if one reads the mandate of UNSC Resolution 794, it is certain that 
ambiguity pervades the document. It is said that the UN was "determined further to 
restore { emphasis added} peace, stability and law and order with a view to facilitating 
the process of a political settlement." It continues with a statement which "strongly 
condemns all violations of international humanitarian law ... and affirms that those 
who ... order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in 
respect of such acts." 
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As aforementioned, former President Bush deployed the troops in recognition 
of the fact that a UN force would take over once the climate was favorable to proper 
and safe aid distribution. However, the new Administration of Bill Clinton soon 
realized that Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali may indeed be right and realized that a 
large force needed to stay in Somalia for an indefinite period. American officials 
believed that if US troops pull out of Somalia in a swift fashion this could undermined 
the mission and chaos would resume as before . This is still a worry, however, the US 
Administration has pledged to withdraw on or before March 31, 1994. Thus, I have 
stated that UNOSOM II has definitely been a peace-enforcement operation. 
Judging success or failure utilizing Diehl's approach is difficult. First of all, I 
believe that UNOSOM II was not a traditional peacekeeping operation in the context 
of Diehl's definition. The fighting had not ceased between the disputants when the 
peacekeepers came to Somalia, and thus were not acting as buffers between the 
combatants. UNOSOM was heavily armed, taboo in Diehl's definition , and later took 
extreme and aggressive military action against one or more parties to the conflict 
violating the condition of neutrality. Clearly, UNOSOM II was not impartial to the 
disputing parties. Action taken against the SNA and Aidid greatly undermined the 
neutrality of UNOSOM and the peacekeeping forces . I believe that this may explain 
UNOSOM II's failure because it violated the characteristics of a peacekeeping 
operation as outlined by Diehl. 
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Utilizing Diehl's Factors: 
When judging the success or failure of UNOSOM II, one must view the 
mission in light of Diehl's factors mentioned in the beginning of the paper. 
1. The force composition came from nearly 31 countries, but the 
majority of the forces were US, a superpower with little experience in 
peacekeeping and the tactics of traditional peacekeeping methods . 
a. Neutrality, a major factor for Diehl, was violated with 
UNOSOM II's personal manhunt for Aidid and the SNA. 
b. The efficiency of command and control was a disaster 
after June 5. Italian troops sided with Aidid which 
displays that infighting between the troops was eroding 
the central command's ability to conduct the operation. It 
is interesting that command and control deteriorated after 
the US handed over total command to the UN. 
2. The authorization of the mission must be analyzed. The UNSC authorized 
both UNOSOM I (which includes Operation Restore Hope) and UNOSOM II. 
Thus, all success or failure for both missions must ultimately be directed to the 
UNSC. 
a. The mandate of the peacekeeping operation changed 
drastically. After June 5th and UNSC Resolution 837, 
personalization of the conflict was evident and neutrality 
was being ignored. I think that this was a major factor 
when analyzing the success or failure of UNOSOM II. 
b. Financing of the mission was conducted on an ad hoc 
basis and, I believe, has not been a factor in the 
operation. Clearly, the majority of the finances have 
come from the United States. 
c. The scope of the mission may have been overly 
ambitious. As noted above, George Bush sent troops on 
a purely humanitarian and limited mission, however, the 
directives changed. Peacekeeping troops, authorized by 
the UNSC, started to maintain law and order, collect 
weapons from armed militia, and reconstruct the law 
code, police force and government. 
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3. When dealing with success or failure, the political/military context of the 
operations must be dealt with. 
a. The type of conflict was intrastate which, at the 
outset, presented major problems for UNOSOM. One 
must remember that peacekeeping operations involved 
with intrastate conflicts are not highly rated by Diehl. 
Disputants are not clearly defined and their are no 
boundaries in which to clearly deploy troops. 
b. There were 17 major sub-national actors (i.e. clans 
and sub-clans) which were jockeying for power and 
control in Somalia. 
c. Many sub-national actors was difficult for UNOSOM 
especially when they would not uphold previous 
agreements and treaties. Thus, cooperation of the 
disputants became a major problem especially when 
dealing with General Aidid and the SNA. 
d. The behavior of the major powers presented 
difficulties for UNOSOM. As stated above, Italy sided 
with a certain faction--the SNA--and helped erode the 
power of UNOSOM. The US, the major power of the 
operation, decided to pull out of the operation after 
negative feedback from the American public which will 
undermine the mission further. 
Thus, I believe that UNOSOM II was an utter failure as viewed utilizing 
Diehl' s indicators from above. 
UNOSOM did not stop the fighting between the disputants and actually became 
a disputant itself with a certain faction. Also, a viable dispute resolution process, one 
of Diehl's factors, was always hailed as necessary; however, UNOSOM was truly 
engaged in "keeping and enforcing" the peace which precluded any time to procure a 
durable agreement with all factions involved. It could also be argued that the UN 
could not properly broker an agreement due to its military involvement and siding with 
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certain Somali factions. The neutrality of UNOSOM had been broken and this greatly 
undermined its mission. 
The local impact has been immense. Civilians were victimized by the guns and 
mortar utilized by both the clans and UNOSOM II. However, with all of its problems, 
the United Nations Operation in Somalia also was involved in the process of nation-
building and has provided some valuable services. Excluding Mogadishu, most of 
Somalia is returning to normal with food supplies getting to remote villages. With the 
stark exception of Mogadishu, an area of peace and security has been achieved in most 
of Somalia. Also, vital processes such as helping to implement a law code and a new 
police force are still being carried out. Thus, civilians have been both helped and 
victimized by the mission. 
A political settlement, which was always touted as a main goal of UNOSOM, 
should continue to be the main priority of the factions and of UNOSOM. Sam 
Perkins, President Bush's Ambassador to the UN stated that "military intervention is 
no substitute for political reconciliation, and that task belongs firmly in the hands of 
the Somalis. "34 This is the case as troops in Somalia enter their second year of 
deployment. 
* * * * 
When first launched, the UN Operation in Somalia was hailed as the operation 
34 US Department of State. Department of State Dispatch. 14 
December, 1992. 
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which could propel peacekeeping as a major tool of international relations and global 
conflict resolution. However, the "new world order" is not so orderly as evidenced by 
Somalia. Clearly, UNOSOM could be the beginning and the end of a grand design for 
global interventionism. 
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